Article

Institutional constraints on legislative lobbying: the case of Indian casino advocacy in New York

Prevailing theory holds that lobbyists lobby their legislative allies, yet the literatures on advocacy and legislative organization suggest that we should not always expect this. Institution design elevates some legislators, and jurisdictional requirements create a contentious environment often forcing lobbyists to lobby their ideological opponents. Drawing on these literatures, I revise the basic lobbying model to predict conditions where we might expect to see advocates contribute to their foes. I test my hypotheses with data on campaign contributions made in New York on the contentious issue of Indian gambling casinos. I find that while advocates often lobbied their allies, they were more likely to contribute heavily to legislative leaders regardless of position, and often even contributed to rank-and-file opponents as the environment became more competitive. I also find that this was systematically different for Indian nations, who appeared to employ a more naïve advocacy strategy than more traditional interest groups.

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